Agnieszka Lekka-Kowalik
ISBN: 978-83-7363-695-8
Pages: 404
Format: B5
Year: 2008
Language: Polish

Książka stanowi analizę jednej z najistotniejszych zmian we współczesnej filozofii nauki: przejś­cia od idei nauki wolnej od wartości do idei nauki nasyconej wartościami. Uznanie nasycenia nauki wartościami to zarazem uznanie, iż sądy wartościujące (wartościowania) są konstytutywnym elementem badania naukowego, a nauka ma wsobny wymiar aksjologiczny. Na tle ideału nauki wolnej od wartościowań autorka przedstawia dwa przełomowe kroki w kształtowaniu się idei obecności wartościowań w nauce: uznanie, iż obecne są w niej wartościowania poznawcze, oraz uznanie, iż obecne są także wartościowania pozapoznawcze, ale nie zagraża to ani racjonalności, ani obiektywności nauki. Następnie autorka analizuje trzy współczesne koncepcje systematycznie wyjaśniające źródła, miejsce i rolę wartościowań poznawczych i pozapoznawczych w strukturze nauki: Evandra Agazziego, Hugha Laceya i Helen Longino. Analiza ta kończy się wnioskiem, że żadna z tych koncepcji nie może być uznana za zadowalającą - zbudowanie koncepcji aksjologicznego wymiaru nauki pozostaje wciąż otwartym projektem badawczym. Rozważania nad wymienionymi koncepcjami pozwalają natomiast wskazać metodologiczno-filozoficzne ramy dla takiego projektu.


TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction

CHAPTER I
The ideal of value-free science

1. Misinterpretations of the value-freedom postulate
1.1. Proscription of passing value-judgments in academic teaching
1.2. Exclusion of value-judgments from the domain of scientific research and debates
1.3. Eliminating from science all judgments related to values
1.4. The lack of any relevance of values to science

2. The proper sense of the value-freedom postulate
2.1. A demand to distinguish clearly in academic teaching factual judgments and value-judgments
2.2. Exclusion of value-judgments from the set of scientific statements
2.3. Impossibility to justify practical goals by means of scientific procedures5
2.4. Proscription of any non-methodological evaluation of research results

3. Arguments for the value-freedom postulate
3.1. Pedagogical argument
3.2. Logico-epistemological argument
3.3. Metaphysical argument

4. Objections against the ideal of value-free science
4.1. Inconsistency between the interdiction to evaluate practical goals and the critical function of science
4.2. Irrationality of the foundation of science
4.3. Impossibility to justify norms of doing science
4.4. An unavoidable dilemma of the researcher: axiological split or indifferentism
4.5. The alleged neutrality of science with regard to practical goals of action
4.6. Biased science?

5. Summation

CHAPTER II
Developing the idea of value-ladenness of science

1. Discovering values in science
1.1. Refutation of the myth of scientific method
1.2. The role of value-judgments in theory choice
1.3. Theory-ladenness of empirical concepts
1.4. Cognitive and non-cognitive value-judgments

2. Limiting the postulate of the value-freedom of science
2.1. Recognition of the presence of value-judgments on the meta-level of science
2.2. The postulate of the freedom of science from non-cognitive values
2.3. Overcoming the description/evaluation dichotomy

3. Non-cognitive value-judgments as constitutive elements of scientific research
3.1. A Moral judgement on consequences of a cognitive error as an epistemic reason
3.2. A judgment on the moral dimension of a research problem as an element of operationalization
3.3. A moral value-judgment as a reason justifying the choice of research methods
3.4. Value-judgment as an auxiliary hypothesis

4. Unsuccessful attempts to defend the ideal of science free from non-cognitive values
4.1. The postulate of value-freedom because of the type of objects investigated
4.2. The postulate of value-freedom because of the pure cognitive goal of research
4.3. Remaining objections against the ideal of science free from non-cognitive values

5. Summation

CHAPTER III
Some conceptions of the value-ladenness of science

1. Evandro Agazzi's system-theoretic approach to the moral dimension of science
1.1. Science as knowledge and as activity
1.2. Various meanings of the neutrality and non-neutrality of science
1.3. Values - manifestations of the "ought"
1.4. The "horizon of values" and practical value-judgments in science
1.5. Models of the perfection of action as reasons for practical value-judgments
1.6. Science and value-judgments in the system-theoretic grasp
1.7. Difficulties of the system-theoretic understanding of value-judgments

2. Hugh Lacey's conception of science developed in research strategies
2.1. Value-complexes
2.2. The role of cognitive values in theory-acceptance
2.3. Research strategy as a determinant of scientific practice
2.4. Feedback between a research strategy and a value-complex
2.5. The possibility of developing science in many research strategies
2.6. Value-free and value-laden moments of scientific practice
2.7. Unsuccessful escape from relativism

3. Helen Longino's critical contextual empiricism - the ideal of science essentially value-laden
3.1. Constitutive and contextual values
3.2. Evidential relations and background assumptions
3.3. Contextual values as non-standard epistemic factors
3.4. Transformative criticism - the source and warrant of the objectivity of knowledge
3.5. The moral foundations of scientific research
3.6. A defense against the charge of relativism
3.7. Questions remaining without answers

5. Summation

CHAPTER IV
Prolegomena to a philosophical conception of the axiological dimension of science

1. Values in science
1.1. Values as properties and as criteria
1.2. The goal of science and values
1.3. Intrinsic values - cognitive values - constitutive values
1.4. Judgments about values and value-judgments
1.5. The problem of justification of constitutive values
1.6. The "oughtness-generating" character of constitutive values

2. The ultimate goal of science: the good of human being
2.1. The horizon of truth
2.2. The unity of knowledge founded on truth
2.3. Scientific knowledge as a good for human being
2.4. The normative dimension of truth

3. The epistemic and social responsibility of science
3.1. Two sense of the term "be responsible for"
3.2. Responsibility for knowledge
3.3. Responsibility for man and society
3.4. The ethos of science

5. Summation

Conclusions
Bibliography
Summary
Index of persons